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THE CLAIMS OF WOMEN OF COLOR UNDER 
TITLE VII: THE INTERACTION OF 
RACE AND GENDER 
African-American women by virtue of our race 
and gender are situated within at least two 
systems of subordination: racism and sexism. 
This dual vulnerability does not simply mean 
that our burdens are doubled but instead, that 
the dynamics of racism and sexism intersect our 
lives to create experiences unique to US. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Ace was created to pro-
tect individuals from discriminatory employment practices 
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.3 Federal 
courts have applied differing standards when a woman of color 
brings a claim which alleges an interaction of two or more of 
these characteristics.4 Since the statute can be read to set out 
these characteristics as if each were mutually exclusive,5 the 
1. Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1467, 1468 (1992). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1993) et. seq.; 110 CONGo REC. 7213 (1964). 
3. Jefferies v. Harris Community Action Ass'n., 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th 
Cir. 1980). 
4. DeGraffenreid V. General Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D. Mo. 
1976). But cr, Jefferies, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032; Judge V. Marsh, 649 F. Supp 770, 
772 (D.D.C. 1986). 
5. This was the original reading of the statute in DeGraffenreid. 413 F. 
Supp. at 143. In Jefferies V. Harris Community Action Ass'n., the Fifth circuit re-
jected this reading stating that House of Representatives had declined to amend 
that statute to include the word "solely," showing the intent to prohibit discrimina-
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courts have initially denied any claim of discrimination based 
on a combination of protected characteristics.s 
When a woman of color claims she has experienced dis-
crimination solely because she is a woman of color, she may be 
faced with unique problems.7 For example, an Asian woman 
may allege discrimination based on being an "Asian woman". 
Federal courts, viewing gender and race as individual charac-
teristics,S would separate the claim into discrimination based 
on race (Asian) and a separate claim based on gender (woman), 
rather than viewing the claim as a single entity.9 The woman 
would have Asian men included in her statistics demonstrating 
race discrimination, and White women included in her statis-
tics showing gender discrimination. 10 
This would not occur if a White man claimed he was dis-
criminated against as a ''White man."ll His claim would not 
be separated into White and male, with Black men included in 
the statistics for gender discrimination and White woman 
included in the claim of race discrimination. 12 The White man 
should not have his claims separated since he is suing as a 
"White man," just as the Asian woman should not have her 
claims separated. While her claims may be bifurcated by the 
courts,13 the White male's would not. 14 
Separation of the claims of women of color along race and 
gender lines has occurred throughout history,I5 including 
6. In DeGraffenreid, for example, the court did not allow the plaintiff to 
claim discrimination based on both gender and race. 413 F. Supp. at 145. In con-
trast, Jefferies u. Harris Community Ass'n, 411 U.S. 792, allowed the plaintiff to 
bring an action based on race, gender and the interaction of the two claims. 
7. See, Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalzing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of AntiDiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory 
and Antiracist Politics, U. OF CHI. LEGAL FORUM 139 (1989). 
8. See, e.g., DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145. 
9. Id. 
10. Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (1994). In Lam, the 
court discussed how the lower court incorrectly split a claim into "Asian" and 
"woman." 
11. Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1991) 
12. Id. 
13. DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145. 
14. Wilson, 934 F.2d 301. 
15. BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WoMAN?, 160-162 (981), PAULA GIDDINGS, 
2
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within social movements such as women's suffrage and eman-
cipation, where the focus was on the single characteristic of 
either sex or race. 16 For example, in 1851 when Sojourner 
Truth rose to give her famous speech "Ain't I a Woman?,,17 at 
the Women's Rights conference in Akron, Ohio, several White 
women tried to keep her silent.1s The fear among the White 
women was that if a Black woman was permitted to speak she 
would change the focus from suffrage to emancipation. 19 
This single characteristic analysis is also used when ana-
lyzing employment discrimination claims for race discrimina-
tion and sex discrimination.20 A dominant view is that sex 
discrimination focuses on White women and that race discrimi-
nation focuses on Black men, thus marginalizing the claims of 
women of color by forcing them into a category that fails to 
fully recognize the scope of their claims.21 
Contrary to the holding of several courts, women of color 
may experience a unique form of discrimination. As Kimberle 
Crenshaw explains, Black women22 experience an "intersec-
WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN 
AMERICA, 54 (1984). 
16. Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority in Sharon v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677 (1973), speaks of the historic discrimination of women and Blacks. In 
describing the historic oppression of both he never speaks of the Black woman. In 
explaining why gender should be a suspect classification under the Equal Protec-
tion analysis, Brennan states, "And although blacks were guaranteed the right to 
vote in 1870, women were denied even that right [ . . . 1 until the adoption of the 
19th Amendment half a century later." Id. at 685. 
17. Soujouner Truth's speech criticized the reasons given by White men 
for disenfranchisement of women. Men stating the women should not be involved 
in the political process since they were too frail and delicate. Truth spoke about 
how she had worked hard in the fields as a slave woman, been lashed by a whip 
and seen her children sold into slavery. BELL HOOKS, supra note 15 at 160. 
18. BELL HOOKS, supra note 15 at 159-160. 
19. BELL HOOKS, supra note 15 at 159. 
20. Peggie Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII, 
14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 21, 33 (1991). 
21. Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 152; ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL 
WOMAN 114-115 (1988). Spelman states that the racial identity of a women is pre-
sumed to be White when it is not stated and Black women are only included 
when there is an explicit reference to Black women. The term Blacks is also large-
ly considered to mean Black men. Id. at 114. 
22. While I focus on employment discrimination cases of Black women 
more than other women of color, it is because there are a limited number of cases 
discussing the claims of other women of color. Thus, the analysis which is used 
3
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tion" of discrimination.23 First, they may experience racism or 
sexism exclusive of each other.24 Second, they may experience 
a combination of these characteristics such as an employment 
policy which is discriminatory to both Blacks and women (dou-
ble discrimination).25 Third, they may experience discrimina-
tion as the single entity of a Black woman, based on stereotype 
different from those shared by White women or Black men26 
(interactive discrimination).27 
This comment will focus on how a single characteristic 
construction of Title VII has distorted and marginalized the 
claims of women of color. Part One illustrates how the courts 
initially refused to recognize the claim of interactive discrimi-
nation. Part Two explains the limited way in which courts 
began to recognize the interactive claims brought by women of 
color. Instead of seeing the plaintiffs as alleging the single 
entity of interactive discrimination, courts have bisected the 
claim into "sex plus race.,,28 Par Three focuses on the issue of 
women of color as adequately representing a class in a class 
action suit. Since a Black women may experience discrimina-
tion in several ways, the courts have grappled with both the 
scope of her claim and who she may represent. Part Four ana-
lyzes the recent Ninth Circuit case of Lam v. University of 
Hawaii29 and sets forth a proposed framework for analyzing 
discrimination claims brought by women of color. 
II. REFUSING THE CLAIM OF INTERACTIVE 
DISCRIMINATION 
The leading case where a federal court considered and 
rejected a claim of interactive discrimination under Title VII is 
for Black women would apply to cases for all women of color. 
23. Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 149. 
24. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1092-1093 (9th Cir. 1975). 
25. Donaldson v. Pillsbury, 554 F.2d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 1977). 
26. Lam, 40 F.3d 1551 at 1562. 
27. Smith, supra note 20 at 23. See also, Elizabeth W. Shoben, Compound 
Discrimination: The interaction of Race and Sex in Employment Discrimination, 55 
N.Y.U L. REV. 973, 796. Shoben uses the term compound discrimination rather 
than interactive discrimination. 
28. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034. 
29. 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994). 
4
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DeGraffenreid v. General Motors. 30 In DeGraffenreid, five 
Black women claimed General Motors' ("GM") seniority system 
of "last hired first fired" had a disparate impact upon Black 
women.31 GM did not hire Black women prior to 1964, and all 
of the Black women who were hired lost their jobs during a 
recession due to GM's lay-off policy.32 The District Court 
granted partial summary judgment for the defendant, holding 
that the plaintiffs could sue on the basis of race or on the basis 
of sex, but they were not allowed to combine the claims.33 In 
rejecting the claim of interactive discrimination, the District 
Court stated that the plaintiffs were combining two causes of 
action, race and gender, which effectively created a special 
subclass.34 The court viewed the claim as beyond the scope of 
Title VII and forced the plaintiffs to chose between claiming 
race discrimination or gender discrimination.35 
... they should not be allowed to combine stat-
utory remedies to create a new 'super-remedy' 
which would give them relief beyond what the 
drafters of relevant statutes intended.36 
The claims were then broken into two individual causes of 
action: race discrimination and sex discrimination.37 The sex 
discrimination claim was dismissed since the women had been 
hired prior to the enactment of Title VII. 38 The plaintiffs 
claim of race discrimination was consolidated with another suit 
brought by Black men alleging GM engaged in race discrimina-
tion.39 Although the plaintiffs asserted in oral argument that 
30. 413 F. Supp. 142 (E. D. Mo. 1976) 
31. [d. at 143. A prima facie case of disparate impact is set out in Griggs 
v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The plaintiff must show that while the 
employers policy is neutral on the face, it has a discriminatory impact on the pro-
tected class of persons. The employer can then rebut the presumption of discrimi-
nation by proving the existence of a business necessity. [d. at 431. Disparate im-
pact is defined at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (1993). 
32. [d. at 144. 
33. [d. at 145. 




38. [d. at 144. 
39. DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145. See Moseley v. General Motors, 
497 F. Supp. 583 (E. D. Mo. 1980). The plaintiffs in Moseley alleged a broad claim 
of race discrimination. The seniority system challenged in DeGraffenreid was not 
considered in the case. Yet, while the women were given a monetary award, back 
5
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the consolidation would not adequately represent their interac-
tive discrimination claim, the court ordered the consolida-
tion.40 The court stated that if it recognized the plaintiffs 
claim of both race and sex discrimination, it would create a 
special subclass beyond the scope of Title VII.41 To permit the 
plaintiffs' claim would open the door to allowing discrimination 
claims based on any combination of factors, which would lead 
to "the prospect of opening a hackneyed Pandora's box. "42 
In denying the plaintiffs claims, the court established a 
structure for analyzing interactive claims using a ''but-for" 
theory."3 The plaintiffs could only bring a cause of action if 
they alleged that but-for one factor they would have been 
treated the same as White men!4 Thus, a claim alleging but-
for race or but-for sex was recognized, while a claim alleging a 
combination of both was seen as beyond the scope of Title 
VII. 45 
The Black women in DeGraffenreid, were required to show 
that the discrimination they experienced was similar to that of 
Black men or White women."6 A woman of color who is forced 
to separate her claims into race or sex discrimination will have 
Black men included in her statistics of race discrimination and 
White women included her claim of sex discrimination."7 
While these statistics will show the effect of either race and 
seniority was not awarded. Id. 
40. DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145. 
41. Id. at 145 
42. Id. 
43. Crenshaw, Intersectionality, supra note 7 at 151. Crenshaw explains 
the theory by analogizing to a room filled with people who are disadvantaged 
stacked on top of each other, with those who are the most disadvantaged at the 
bottom. The people at the top are brushing up against what is the floor for people 
who are not disadvantaged. In order to be able to climb through the hatch in the 
floor to the other room with those who are not disadvantaged, a person must 
claim that "but for" one characteristic they would have been treated the same as 
the others. 
44. Id. at 152. 
45. DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145. Since the Black women were 
denied the claim of interactive discrimination, the court considered all women for 
gender discrimination claim. Id. 
46. Id. at 143, Smith, supra note 20 at 33. 
47. DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 143. 
6
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sex discrimination, these statistics will not be evidence of in-
teractive discrimination.48 
While such a standard is inadequate,49 the District Court 
in DeGraffenreid concluded that the existence of interactive 
discrimination granted too much protection to women of color 
under Title VII, and denied the plaintiffs the right to bring 
such a claim. 50 Although a minority of jurisdictions follow the 
analysis of DeGraffenreid, 51 the following cases demonstrate 
how the courts tend to return to this analysis. 
III. RECOGNIZING THE CLAIM OF INTERACTIVE 
DISCRIMINATION 
In Jefferies v. Harris Community Action Ass'n,52 the Fifth 
Circuit first recognized the combined claims of both race and 
sex discrimination. A Black woman brought an individual 
disparate treatment53 action against Harris Community Ac-
tion Association, alleging sex discrimination, race discrimina-
tion and interactive discrimination. 54 Jefferies was employed 
48. See, e.g., Crenshaw, Intersectionality, supra note 7 at 152. Crenshaw 
notes that forcing a Black woman into alleging sex and race separately 
marginalizes there experiences and fails to address the plaintiffs real cause of 
action. Id. 
49. Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1562, fn. 19 (1994). 
50. DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145. The court feared plaintiffs would 
claim discrimination based on many or all of the characteristics stated in Title 
VII, and there would be no way to contain the scope of Title VII. Id 
51. Since DeGraffenreid, other cases such as Chambers v. Omaha Girls 
Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D Neb. 1986) and Graham v. Benedix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 
1036 (N.D. Ind. 1984) have recognized the claim of interactive discrimination. 
52. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). 
53. The prima facie case for a disparate treatment case is set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The plaintiff has the 
burden of showing that the job was open, she applied and was qualified for the 
job, despite her qualifications she was rejected and the position remained open 
and the employer continued to seek applicants. [d. at 802. 
The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to articulate a non-
discriminatory reason why the plaintiff was not hired. The plaintiff, retaining the 
ultimate burden of persuasion, can argue that the reason given by the employer is 
pretext. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-254 
(1981). 
54. The plaintiffs original claim included age discrimination but it is not 
discussed as part of her claim in this opinion. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1030. See, 
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as a secretary and had been denied several promotions within 
the company.55 When two new promotions were posted, she 
applied for both but was denied the promotions. A Black man 
and a White woman were promoted instead of the plaintiff. 56 
The District court found in favor of the defendant57 and held 
that since a Black man and a White woman had been promot-
ed the plaintiff had failed to prove her prima facie case.58 The 
Fifth Circuit applied the "sex-plus" analysis established in 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,59 which split the plaintiff's 
claim into gender discrimination plus discrimination based on 
a neutral factor60 and applied this theory to Jefferies claim of 
interactive discrimination.61 
The Jefferies court recognized that employers are not al-
lowed to discriminate against women with children or married 
women since that is a form of unlawful discrimination based 
on sex plus the neutral factor of having children or being mar-
ried.62 If employers are prohibited from discriminating on this 
basis, it would be illogical to allow discrimination against the 
subclass of Black women,63 since race and gender are two pro-
tected classes under Title VII.64 Thus, the court held that 
when a Black woman claimed interactive discrimination, "the 
fact that black males or white females are not subject to the 
discrimination is irrelevant."65 
The plaintiffs were allowed to claim race discrimination, 
55. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1029. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1030-1031. 
58. Id. at 1031. See note 53, supra, discussing the prima facie case. 
59. 411 F.2d. 1-4, affd, in Philips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 
(1971). Based on a company policy which forbade the hiring of women with pre-
school age children, the plaintiffs brought a systematic disparate treatment claim. 
The court held this was sex discrimination plus the neutral characteristic of hav-
ing a preschool age child. Id. 
60. Id. 




65. Id. at 1034. The court also refuted the finding in DeGraffenreid that 
the plaintiffs claim was beyond the type of protection which Congress had intend-
ed since Congress had denied amending the act to include the word "solely." Id. at 
1032. 
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sex discrimination and interactive discrimination.66 In analyz-
ing these claims the Fifth Circuit found no evidence of race 
discrimination but remanded the claim of sex discrimination 
for further findings.67 After recognizing the claim of interac-
tive discrimination the court also remanded this claim.68 
The court in Jefferies employed several analytical devices 
for interactive discrimination claims. First, it allowed women 
of color to seek remedy for interactive discrimination.69 It also 
recognized the claim of interactive discrimination as a separate 
cause of action with its own evidence, distinct from a race or 
sex claim. 70 Even in the absence of race discrimination, a 
women of color may still have a claim for interactive discrimi-
nation.71 Because of this a Black woman, in a disparate treat-
ment case, may proffer evidence showing that both Black men 
and Black women were discriminated against to support her 
claim of race discrimination.72 She can also proffer evidence of 
discrimination solely against Black women to prove interactive 
discrimination.73 
Not all aspects of the Jefferies decision were an advance 
for women claiming interactive discrimination. The court 
phrased the claim within a sex-plus analysis.74 In essence, the 
court stated that but-for sex and an added characteristic, the 
plaintiff would have been treated the same as a White man.75 
This continues to characterize Black women as a compound of 
two separate parts instead of as the single entity of "Black 
women." The court should not use the analysis of sex-plus for a 
66. Id at 1034-1035. 
67. Id. at 1032. 
68. Id. at 1035. 
69. Id. at 1034. 
70. Id. 
71. Judith Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, 
and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 79 CAL. 
L. REV. 775 at 800. Winston concludes the significance of the court not finding 
race discrimination but remanding the claim of interactive discrimination infers 
that the independent findings of race and gender discrimination may bolster each 
other so that the sum is greater than the parts. Id. at 80l. 
72. Jefferies, 615 F. Supp. at 1033. 
73. Id. 
74. Id at 1033. Shoben, supra note 27, at page 804 criticizes the use of 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
422 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:413 
Black woman's claim, but instead should limit it to claims in 
which the "plus" is an immutable characteristic.76 By using 
the sex-plus analysis, the court infers that the race of Black 
women is a secondary characteristic, to be analyzed in addition 
to the sex discrimination claim.77 Thus, the door is left open 
for lower courts to tally how many factors a person is removed 
from the "norm" (Le. White male) and then decide if the claim 
is one which the court will recognize.78 
Such an analysis dictated the court's decision in Judge v. 
Marsh.79 The plaintiff was a Black woman employed by the 
United States Army.80 The Army had a small panel which 
rated and referred all employees for promotion.81 The plaintiff 
claimed that the panel inaccurately summarized her qualifica-
tions and failed to recommend her because she was a Black 
woman.82 She alleged a claim of disparate treatment based on 
interactive discrimination due to the defendant's failure to 
select her for promotions and to assign her higher promotion 
ratings.53 . 
Using the sex-plus analysis from Jefferies, the District 
Court held that plaintiff could only allege one "plus."B4 If the 
plaintiff was allowed allege more than one protected character-
istic, there would be protected sub-groups for every combina-
tion of characteristics protected under Title VII. 85 The court 
illustrated this problem by using the analogy of a many headed 
Hydra.86 Taken to the extreme, the Jefferies rationale would 
76. Cathy Scarborough, Conceptualizing Black Women's Employment Expe-
riences, 98 YALE L. J. 1457, 1472 (1989). 
77. Smith, supra note 20 at 44, Shoben, supra note 27 at 804. 
78. Scarborough, supra note 76 at 1471. 
79. 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986). 
80. Id. at 772. 
81. Id. at 773 
82. Id. at 775. 
83. Id. 
84. Judge, 649 F. Supp. at 780. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. In both DeGraffenreid and Judge, the courts analogize the Black 
women's claims to mythological female monsters. Hydra was a multi-headed water 
serpent who grew two heads for every one which was cut oft'. Hydra was killed by 
Hercules who burned oft' the heads. Pandora was created by Zeus to plague man-
kind. Zeus gave her a box containing diseases and trouble which she opened and 
let the evils escape leaving only hope left in the box. GroUer Electronic Publishing 
10
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allow for protected sub-groups which combine all of the charac-
teristics protected under Title VILs7 The court stated that the 
Jefferies analysis is Umited to "one protected, immutable trait 
or fundamental right, which are directed against individuals 
sharing a second protected, immutable characteristic."ss By 
narrowing the scope of Title VII the court stated that Title VII 
will "not be splintered beyond the use of recognition."s9 
The District Court in Judge made it clear that a woman of 
color can only deviate so far from the norm of a White male 
before the claim is viewed as too obscure,9o because her claim 
consists of too many factors removed from the "norm" to be 
recognized.91 For example, a Black woman alleging discrimi-
nation based on the interaction of race, sex and age92 would 
have to choose only two factors, even though this would inade-
quately address her claim.93 While she may experience dis-
crimination based on each factor separately (because she is 
Black, a woman or older) this does not preclude the fact that 
she was discriminated against based on the stereo-type which 
derived from the claim being seen as one entity (an older Black 
woman).94 
The conflict between splitting apart a plaintiff's claim into 
multiple factors and looking at it as a single entity does not 
always occur when a plaintiff brings a claim of interactive 
discrimination.95 For example, the federal courts do not sepa-
Co.(1983). 
87. Judge, 649 F. Supp. 770, at 780. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. 
90. Not all courts have followed this analysis. For example, in Chambers 
v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), the court allowed the 
plaintiff to allege that she was discriminated against on the basis of being an 
unmarried pregnant Black woman. [d. at 947. 
91. Judge, 649 F. Supp. at 780. The court did allow the plaintiff to claim 
interactive discrimination, but it was dismissed for failure to meet the ultimate 
burden of persuasion. [d. at 781. 
92. This was the original claim brought by the plaintiff in Jefferies v. 
Harris Community Action Ass'n , 411 U.S. 792 (1973) at 1029. 
93. Smith, supra note 20 at 46. 
94. In Chambers, 629 F. Supp. 925 at 944, the plaintiff claimed she was 
discriminated against based on the stereo-type of being an unmarried, pregnant, 
Black woman. 
95. Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 142. 
11
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rate the claims of a White woman into White and woman.96 A 
White woman's claim is not seen as creating a "many-headed 
Hydra" as referred to in Judge, since courts only sees her as 
claiming that ''but-for'' her gender she would not have been 
discriminated against. She is not required to claim her race as 
a part of her discrimination claim, since Whiteness is seen as a 
race neutral characteristic.97 
A similar analysis can be drawn with a discrimination 
claim brought by a White man. For example in Wilson v. 
Bailey,98 two White men who were deputy sheriffs brought a 
disparate treatment action alleging "reverse discrimination" 
due to the City's voluntary affirmative action plan.99 They 
alleged that, "minorities and women were promoted," rather 
than White men. 100 In analyzing this claim, the court did not 
separate the claim into race and gender with statistics of Black 
men included in the claim for gender discrimination and White 
women included in the statistics of race discrimination. 101 
There was no debate at all about the plaintiffs ability to allege 
an interactive claim, and the court merely viewed the plaintiffs 
as claiming the single entity of ''White men" as the basis of 
discrimination. 102 
The federal courts do not look to Wilson as a precedent for 
interactive discrimination in Title VII cases since these courts 
do not see the White men as alleging a claim of interactive 
discrimination. 103 Since courts often proceed as if White men 
are considered the norm,I04 their claim will not be viewed as 
96. Price Water House v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price the 
plaintiff claimed gender discrimination. The plaintiff did not have to specify her 
race since it is assumed with a White woman that race is not an issue but only 
gender. [d. at 236. Scarborough, supra note 76 at 1468. 
97. Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 145. 
98. 934 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1991). 
99. [d. at 304. 
100. [d. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. See also, Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va., 940 F.2d 1394 (4th Cir. 
1991), Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1991). 
103. [d., Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 142 ft. note 12, states that no case 
has been discovered in which white men were not allowed to bring a reverse dis-
crimination claim due because the claim alleged discrimination based on the inter-
action of race and gender. 
104. Scarborough, supra note 76 at 1476. 
12
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obscure or alleging too many factors that remove them from 
the norm. 105 The problem of obscuring claim only occurs 
when a plaintiff alleges different characteristics other than just 
race or sex.106 Despite the cases which have allowed reverse 
discrimination,107 lower courts have only sporadically allowed 
woman of color to allege an interactive claim, while always 
allowing them to allege discrimination on the basis of race and 
gender as separate factors to be proved independently. lOS 
IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF ADEQUATE 
REPRESENTATION IN CLASS ACTIONS 
Struggling with the complex manner in which women of 
color can experience discrimination, the courts have been un-
able to formulate a standard analysis to determine when a 
woman of color can adequately represent a class. As evidenced 
from Jefferies and Judge 109 women of color may claim dis-
crimination based on race, sex, a combination of both, or inter-
active discrimination. 110 When a woman is alleging bothlll 
interactive discrimination and sex discrimination, she cannot 
represent a class of women who allege sex discrimination. l12 
Often the federal courts will view her claims as placing her at 




Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 154-155; Scarborough, supra note 76 at 
[d. 
107. Wilson, 934 F.2d at 304. See also, Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va., 
940 F.2d 1394 (4th Cir. 1991), Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 940 F.2d 
1394 (11th Cir. 1991). 
108. See, Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994), Park-
er v. Secretary, H.U.D, 891 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1989), Jefferies v. Harris Commu-
nity Action Ass'n 615 F.2d 412, Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986), 
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp 925 (D. Neb. 1986), Graham v. 
Benedix Corp., 585 F. Supp 1036 (N.D. Ind. 1984). 
109. Jefferies v. Harris Community Action Ass'n., 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 
1980); Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986). 
110. See notes 34 to 45 for a discussion on Jefferies and notes 79-84 for a 
discussion of Judge. 
111. Donaldson v. Pillsbury, 554 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1977). In Donaldson, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the employer had a policy which had an adverse impact 
on Blacks and women. [d. at 829. 
112. Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 482-484 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
113. [d. at 479-480. 
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woman of color to represent a class if she stays within the 
strict limits of a but-for theory.u4 
In Moore u. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., U5 Black women 
brought a class action alleging both sex discrimination and 
race discrimination in the employer's promotion practices. u6 
The plaintiffs claimed the company's promotion policy had a 
disparate impact on both Blacks and women. U7 For the sex 
discrimination claim, Moore petitioned the court to represent a 
broader class which included all females. us The Ninth Circuit 
confirmed the lower court's holding and refused to certify 
Moore as the class representative, since the class included both 
Black women and White women. 119 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Moore had not claimed 
"she was discriminated against as a female but only as a Black 
female."120 The court forced Moore into a narrower claim of 
interactive discrimination even though she alleged disparate 
impact on the basis of race and sex.121 Moore was only al-
lowed to use evidence that "Black women" were discriminated 
againse22 rather than being able to show that Black women 
would be affected by any policy which had a disparate impact 
against Blacks and/or women.123 Without the use of both sets 
of statistics, Moore was unable to make out her prima facie 
case for discrimination. 124 
In order for Moore to represent the class of women, even 
in a disparate impact case, she was required to allege sex dis-
crimination claims separately. 125 Once Moore claimed dis-
crimination as a "Black women" she narrowed the scope of her 
114. [d. 
115. 708 F.2d 475, 483 (9th Cir. 1983). 
116. [d. at 478. 
117. [d. at 483. 
118. [d. at 479. 
119. [d. at 480. 
120. Moore, 708 F.2d at 480. 
121. [d. 
122. [d. at 482-484. 
123. [d. 
124. [d. at 485, Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 146. 
125. Moore, 708 F.2d at 480. 
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claim and placed herself at odds with White women. 126 The 
Ninth Circuit viewed the interactive claim as alleging she was 
discriminated against in favor of both Black men and White 
women, and thus she is unable to adequately represent the 
class of women. 127 
It is inconsistent to argue, in a disparate impact case, that 
once Moore claimed interactive discrimination she would be 
precluded from claiming discrimination on the basis of her 
gender or race. 128 Since Moore is Black, she would be ad-
versely affected by any policy which discriminates on the basis 
of race. In addition, since she is a woman, she will be adverse-
ly effected by any policy which discriminates on the basis of 
gender. The complex nature in which women of color experi-
ence discrimination has led the courts to view her as having 
"greater standing" in the law, seen in both DeGraffenreid and 
Judge. 129 Ironically, women of color, as evidenced from the 
prior cases, have a greater need to claim interactive discrimi-
nation, and yet the courts restrict the scope of their claims. 130 
Women of color are forced to bring their claims within the but-
for analysis, allowing them to allege only part of their 
claim. 131 Forcing the claim into such a narrow analysis only 
allows for small changes within the field of employment 
law. 132 
To avoid restricting the plaintiffs ability to represent a 
class, as seen in Moore, a plaintiff can bring class actions alleg-
ing race discrimination and sex discrimination separately, but 
cannot claim interactive discrimination if she hopes to be 
viewed as adequately representing the class. 133 For example, 
in Donaldson v. Pillsbury134 the plaintiff, a Black woman, 
126. Crenshaw, supra at note 7, at 144-146. 
127. Moore, 708 F.2d at 480. 
128. See, Crenshaw supra note 7, at 144. Once Moore specified her race, 
the court narrowed her claim and saw her as placing herself at odds with White 
women.ld. 
129. DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, 413 F. Supp. at 143 and Judge, 649 
F. Supp. at 780. 
130. Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 145. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
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brought a claim of disparate impact alleging discrimination 
against Black and women employees who had been denied 
employment or promotion on the basis of race or sex.135 Re-
versing the District court's finding that the plaintiffs did not 
meet the "typicality" requirement for class actions, the Eighth 
Circuit stated, "the defendant's practices had the effect of lim-
iting job opportunities of women and blacks."136 
The plaintiff was able to certify her suit since she alleged 
discrimination based on a combination of two separate fac-
tors.137 Thus, the court included statistics of Black men for 
her race discrimination claim and White women for her sex 
discrimination claim.13B Having alleged race discrimination 
and sex discrimination separately, the federal courts will not 
force the women into an interactive claim and thus perceived 
them as being at odds with the other plaintiffs.139 As long as 
the plaintiff remains within the but-for analysis she will be 
seen as adequately representing the claims of the class. l40 Al-
ternatively, even when a plaintiff stays within a strict but-for 
analysis only alleging sex and/or race discrimination, the 
courts may still restrict the scope of a Black woman's claim 
when there is not only a disparity between the Black employ-
ees and the White employees or all male employees and female 
employees, but also where there is a disparity between the 
Black men and the Black women. 141 
In Payne v. Travenol,142 two Black women brought a 
class action suit alleging race discrimination on behalf of all 
the Black employees and later amended the complaint to in-
clude sex discrimination. l43 No Blacks were employed by 
Travenol prior to 1965.144 When Blacks were hired, the plain-
135. Id. at 829. 
136. Id. at 832. The statistics proffered by the plaintiff was separated into 
Black solely and sex solely. There was no evidence proffered regarding the status 
of Black women. Id. at 830. See FED R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
137. Donaldson, 554 F.2d at 832. 
138. Id. at 830. 
139. Id. at 83l. 
140. Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 145, c.r, Moore, 708 F.2d 480. 
141. Payne v. Travenol, 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 805. 
144. Id. 
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tiffs claimed Travenol's employment policy had a disparate 
impact on Blacks since Travenol required a 10th grade educa-
tion for the assembly line jobs and twelfth grade or college 
education requirement to be employed as a clerk or techni-
cian. l45 At the request of the defendant, the court restricted 
the scope of the plaintiffs' claim to only include Black wom-
en. l46 Although the plaintiffs were claiming a disparity be-
tween Black and White employees,147 the court narrowed the 
scope of the claim since there was a disparity between the 
Black men and the Black women. 146 
The females, therefore sought to establish that 
the males were favored at their expense. This 
claim plainly draws at the interests of the males 
into contrast with the interests of the fe-
males. 149 
Yet, the plaintiffs were not claiming interactive discrimi-
nation but discrimination based on race and sex separately 
(double discrimination).15o They were not placing themselves 
at odds with the Black men by stating that the Black men 
were treated more favorably than the Black women. The plain-
tiffs were alleging they had been adversely affected by both 
discriminatory practices.151 While the plaintiffs were able to 
use the over-all statistics of race discrimination, after they pre-
vailed the Black men were unable to share in the remedy.152 
This not only demonstrates how a but-for analysis restricts the 
scope of Black women's claims, but also shows how the Fifth 
Circuit viewed a conflict along both race and gender lines. 153 
Since Payne alleged sex discrimination, the court viewed her 
as placing herself at odds with the Black men,154 despite the 
145. [d. 
146. Payne, 673 F.2d at 807. 
147. [d. at 809. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. at 810. 
150. [d. at 809. 
151. Payne, 673 F.2d at 809. 
152. [d. at 812. 
153. The court forced the plaintiffs to chose between discrimination based 
on race to represent the Black men or chose to claim discrimination based on 
gender which disallows the plaintiffs to represent the Black men. [d. at 811, 
Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 148. 
154. Payne, 673 F.2d at 810. 
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fact that she included a claim of race discrimination in which 
the Black men are similarly situated to Payne. 155 
In contrast to Payne, Tennie v. City of New York Dep't of 
Soc. Serv. 156 allowed Black women to represent the claims of 
all minority women although the plaintiffs were not all of the 
same race. 157 Six Black women and one Hispanic woman 
brought a class action based on a claim of interactive discrimi-
nation in which the class included both Black women and 
Hispanic women. 158 The plaintiffs were previously employed 
as children's counselor's in various Department of Social Ser-
vices (DSS) institutions but were transferred to other DSS 
departments when the City closed several of the offices. 159 
When the plaintiffs were transferred their salary declined, 
which they claimed was due to their race and gender. 160 
Since all the females alleged discrimination based on the sta-
tus of minority women, they were able to be certified as a 
class. 161 The District Court viewed the claims as alleging that 
all of the plaintiffs were discriminated against in favor of 
White males due to their race and gender. 162 "Thus, both 
blacks and Hispanics are alleging that they have been discrim-
inated against in precisely the same manner.,,163 
The District Court placed the claim into the analysis of 
but-for one characteristic, (being a women of color) the plain-
tiffs would not have been adversely affected by the employer's 
policy.l64 Unlike the court in Payne, the court in Tennie did 
not view the minority women as being in conflict with each 
other.165 Even though a Hispanic woman may be discriminat-
155. [d. at 810-811. 
156. 1987 WL 6156 (S.D. N.Y. 1987). 
157. [d. at *2. 
158. The class originated as all employees who worked as counselors in 
New York city prior to 1977 and now work in other divisions. The class therefore 
included persons of both sexes and including Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. [d. at 
*3. 
159. [d. at *2 
160. [d. 
161. Tennie, 1987 WL 6156 at *3. 
162. [d. 
163. [d. 
164. Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 151, explains the but-for analysis used by 
the courts. 
165. Tennie, 1987 WL 6156 at *3. 
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ed against based on a different stereotype than a Black wom-
an, they were both claiming that all men and all White em-
ployees were treated more favorably, and because of this the 
Black women were able to represent the claims of Hispanic 
women. 166 
In comparing both Payne and Tennie, it is clear that the 
plaintiffs are not analyzed by their own experiences of discrim-
ination but how they are treated in comparison to White 
men. 167 While this may be helpful in proving the discrimina-
tory practice, the initial focus of the claim should be on what 
the plaintiffs are claiming as the basis of the discrimination 
and who else has been adversely affected by this discriminato-
ry act or policy.16s Not only do the courts prematurely view a 
conflict between the plaintiffs when defining the scope of the 
claim but the courts will also restrict what the plaintiffs may 
claim as the basis of the discrimination, as seen in Moore and 
DeGraffenreid. 169 
v. A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
Mer examining the various ways in which the federal 
courts have analyzed the claims of women of color, this com-
ment proposes that for an individual disparate treatment case, 
the courts draw from parts of the analysis in Lam v. University 
of Hawaii 170 and expanded upon in Good v. U.S. West Com-
munications. l7l For a claim of disparate impact, courts should 
draw from Lam to set up a framework for the analysis, but 
should also consider the problems that may arise in class ac-
tions as seen in Moore 172 and Payne. 173 
166. [d. 
167. [d. at *3. 
168. See, Castro and Corral, Women of Color and Employment Discrimina-
tion: Race and Gender Combined in Title VII Claims, 6 La Raza L.J. 159. This 
articles focuses an the need to focus on the individual's claim rather than separat-
ing the plaintiffs claim into single factors. 
169. DeGraffenreid 413 F. Supp at 143 and Moore, 708 F. Supp. at 480. 
170. 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994). 
171. 1995 WL 67672 *1 (D. Or. 1995). 
172. See discussion of Moore, supra notes 114-13l. 
173. See discussion of Payne, supra notes 140-153. 
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In Lam, an Asian woman brought a claim of individual 
disparate treatment in the University's hiring practices.174 A 
small committee was appointed to recommend a person for the 
position of Director of the Pacific Asian Legal Studies.175 Per-
sons less qualified than Lam were considered for the job and 
one of the committee members evaluating Lam stated there 
should not be another woman teaching commercial law. 176 
The Dean recognized that this member had difficulty dealing 
. with women. 177 The District Court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendants since the committee had favorably 
considered an Asian man and a White woman. 178 Following 
the analysis in DeGraffenreid, the District Court separated her 
claim into race and gender separately, and did not allow her to 
state a claim for interactive discrimination. 179 In reversing 
the District Court, the Ninth Circuit relied on Jefferies and the 
works of both Kimberle Crenshaw and Judith Winston. 180 
Rather than aiding the decisional process, the 
attempt to bisect identity at the intersection of 
race and gender often distorts or ignores the 
particular nature of their experiences ... Asian 
women are subject to a set of stereo-types and 
assumptions that are neither shared by Asian 
men nor white women ... when a plaintiff is 
claiming race and sex bias, it is necessary to 
determine whether the employer discriminates 
on the basis of that combination of factors, not 
just whether it discriminates against the people 
of the same race or of the same sex. 181 
The Lam decision establishes several useful tools for ana-
lyzing interactive discrimination cases. First, the court focused 
more on the plaintiffs individual basis of discrimination as 
opposed to splitting apart her claim.182 The Ninth Circuit not 
only recognized the claim of interactive discrimination but also 
174. Lam, 40 F.3d at 1558. 
175. Id. at 1552. 
176. Id. at 1557. 
177. Id. at 1564. 
178. Id. 
179. Lam, 40 F.3d at 156l. 
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stated that the District court was incorrect in separating Lam's 
claim.183 The District Court had reduced the claim into Asian 
men plus White women, which had distorted Lam's claim. 1M 
Lam alleged discrimination based in being on Asian woman 
and not solely as an Asian or as a woman. 185 The Ninth Cir-
cuit identified the inherent fallacy of splitting the claim by 
analogizing to the bisection of a White man's claim using sta-
tistics of Asian men in his claim for gender discrimination and 
statistics of White women in his claim for race discrimina-
tion.186 
Second, the court recognized that the Asian women are 
subject to stereo-types that are not shared by either Asian men 
or White women, showing a clear need for courts to recognize 
the claims of intersectionality.187 Third, the court recognized 
the complexity of a woman of color's claim stating that a court 
cannot" ... bisect a person's identity at the intersection of 
race and gender ... ,,188 Still, the court also acknowledged 
that a woman of color may be subjected to single factor dis-
crimination such as solely race or solely sex. 189 
While the Ninth Circuit's analysis advances the ability of 
women of color to bring an interactive claim, the court falls 
into several of the same problem areas as earlier decisions. 
First, the decision speaks of Lam's claim of interactive discrim-
ination as a combination of two factors instead of as the single 
unity of an Asian woman. 190 While the Ninth Circuit did not 
analyze the claim as a combination of factors, the language 
used by the Ninth Circuit may cause other federal courts to 
fall back into the sex-plus analysis that was used in Judge, 
which considered the number of factors a person is removed 
from the norm as the basis of discrimination. 191 Further, the 
183. Id. 
184. Lam, 40 F.3d at 1562. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. The court refers to J. Hagedorn, Asian Women in Film: No joy, No 
Luck, MS. Jan./Feb., 1994 at 74, which illustrates some of the stereotypes which 
Asian women are subjected to such as geisha, dragon lady and concubine. Id. 
188. Lam, 40 F.3d 1582. 
189. Id. at 1561-62. 
190. Id. 
191. Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986). 
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court speaks of Asian women as a separate subgroup protected 
under Title VII. 192 This may result in revisiting the class ac-
tion problems of Payne,193 where the Black women were seen 
as a subgroup and thus unable to represent all Black employ-
ees for the claim of race discrimination. 194 
Utilizing the theory set forth in Lam, the District Court in 
Good v. U.S. West Communications , 195 expanded the theory of 
interactive discrimination beyond Title VII to include age dis-
crimination protected by the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act ("ADEA").196 The plaintiff claimed she was discrimi-
nated against based on the interactive claim of age and sex 
discrimination since she was replaced by a younger male. 197 
The District court initially granted summary judgment for the 
defendant on the age discrimination claim. 198 Good then 
moved the District Court to reinstate her claim of age discrimi-
nation since she claimed discrimination based on being an 
older woman, rather than alleging age and sex separately.199 
Focusing on the Good's original claim of discrimination, the 
court cited Lam200 and stated that the theory of interactive 
discrimination applies to the ADEA and not just Title VII 
claims.201 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Good focused on the need to allow the plaintiff to individu-
ally state what she believes is the basis for the discrimina-
tion.202 Both Lam and Good should be allowed to state what 
192. Lam, 40 F.3d at 1562. 
193. Payne, 673 F.2d at 810. 
194. Id. 
195. 1995 WL 67672 *1 (D. Or. 1995). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at *1. Sex discrimination is protected under Title VII and age dis-
crimination is protected under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 
See 29 U.S.C.A. 623. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Good, 1995 WL 67672 at *1. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 1561, fn. 16, the court noted that Lam also alleged National 
Origin discrimination since the Asian man who was considered for her position 
was Chinese and Lam is Vietnamese-French. Id. 
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type of discrimination they have been subjected to and not 
have a court determine what the basis of the claim should 
be.203 For example, if a Chicana woman brings a claim for 
interactive discrimination in a disparate treatment case, the 
law should not perceive the claim as a combination of race, 
color, sex and national origin but as the single entity in which 
she has experienced the discrimination, a Chicana woman.204 
Just as plaintiffs in most other fields of law can determine 
which claims they are to bring forth in a lawsuit, so should a 
woman of color in a Title VII action.205 
This same focus on the individual's experience of discrimi-
nation in a disparate treatment case should be applicable to 
disparate impact cases. If a woman of color is alleging discrimi-
nation based on race, she should be able to represent the class 
of persons who also allege race discrimination.206 The fact 
that she may also bring a claim of sex discrimination or inter-
active discrimination should not bar her from representing the 
class for a claim of race discrimination.207 Just because she 
may have been subjected to other forms of discrimination, does 
not mean that she has not been subjected to race discrimina-
tion, and is not typical of the class.208 She should still be able 
to both represent the class for a race discrimination suit and 
be a member of the other classes.209 
Instead of trying to compare separate claims of race or sex 
discrimination by looking at how these claims separate the 
plaintiff from the norm, each claim needs to be looked on its 
individual merits.210 The preliminary focus should be on how 
the plaintiff has experienced the discrimination and not what 
the courts believe the plaintiff should allege as the basis for 
203. Lam, 40 F.3d at 1562, Good 1995 WL 67672 at *1. 
204. Scarborough, supra note 76 at 1476, explains protected groups of peo-
ple have distinct histories and their claims should be understood based on their 
own experiences. 
205. Id. 
206. See supra notes 114 to 131 for a discussion of Moore v. Hughes Heli-
copter, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1983). 
207. Id. 
208. See supra notes 140 to 153 for a discussion of Payne v. Travenol, 673 
F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982). 
209. Crenshaw, supra note 7 at 144-148. 
210. Scarborough, supra note 76 at 1476. 
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discrimination. Courts need to allow a woman of color to claim 
interactive discrimination, but not force her into a class of 
interactive discrimination if she is only alleging race or gender 
discrimination.211 
While focusing on the individual may not solve all prob-
lems with intersectionality claims, it will create an awareness 
in the judicial system of how a person may be subjected to 
discrimination in a wide variety of forms. Allowing the plaintiff 
to individually determine the basis for a claim of discrimina-
tion and represent all people who have been subjected to the 
same type of discrimination, the court will allow for a broader 
reform in current structure of both employment law and em-
ployment practices. 
Mary Elizabeth Powell' 
211. See supra notes 114 to 131 for a discussion of Moore. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996. I am grateful for all 
the guidance and constructive criticism given to me by my advisor Professor David 
Benjamin Oppenheimer and my Editor Scott Bloom. I am also indebted to 
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